The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel Enforcement by Ghosal, Vivek & Sokol, D. Daniel
University of Florida Levin College of Law 
UF Law Scholarship Repository 
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel Enforcement 
Vivek Ghosal 
D. Daniel Sokol 
University of Florida Levin College of Law, sokold@law.ufl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rise and (Potential) Fall of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
471 (2020) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
  
 
471 
THE RISE AND (POTENTIAL) FALL OF U.S. 
CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
Vivek Ghosal* 
D. Daniel Sokol** 
Government enforcement against collusion, now viewed by the Su-
preme Court as the “supreme evil” in antitrust, has gone through various 
phases of enforcement in the United States. There have been periods in 
which cartels have been able to collude more or less effectively given vari-
ous institutional tools at the disposal of the government. By analyzing en-
forcement and prosecutions data over a long time horizon, 1969–2016, this 
Article examines the attributes of cartel enforcement over time and the 
changing use of tools to assist with detection and punishment. We provide 
a comprehensive description of critical cartel enforcement events and insti-
tutional developments from 1890 to the present. Our examination of the 
data includes a detailed descriptive analysis which tends to reveal three 
broad phases of U.S. cartel enforcement and prosecutions. The most recent 
data indicate a marked decline in the number of prosecutions, but sharp 
increase in per capita penalties. We also conduct regression-based estima-
tion of the potential quantitative impact of the key institutional innovations 
to foster detection and prosecutions. Based on the raw data as well as our 
estimation, we comment on the potential factors that may be driving lower 
prosecutions in the more recent years. Finally, we briefly compare some 
key data between U.S. and European Commission cartel prosecutions to 
examine potential dynamic interlinkages.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Cartel enforcement, covering cases against price fixing, market allocation, 
and bid rigging, makes headlines. In 2017 alone, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) Antitrust Division fined Citicorp $925 million, Barclays $650 million, 
and JP Morgan $550 million criminally for their participation in price fixing car-
tels.1 The loss to consumers that cartels create through collusion is unambiguous, 
so much so that the United States Supreme Court has called cartels the “the su-
preme evil of antitrust.”2 Yet, active enforcement against collusion was not al-
ways so, and also seems to be undergoing important shifts in recent years. This 
Article traces the evolution of the design of the institutional setting of U.S. cartel 
enforcement by examining its three major attributes: fines, criminal penalties, 
and leniency over time.  
Since at least the 1970s, cartel enforcement started undergoing substantive 
transformation.  Though Gary Becker did not explicitly mention antitrust in his 
foundational formulation of optimal deterrence,3 a number of scholars have ap-
plied Becker’s framework to antitrust for more than a generation.4 The optimal 
 
 1. Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more (last visited Jan. 
18, 2020). 
 2. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
 3. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 4. See Michael K. Block et al., The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429 
(1981); Jean-Claude Bosch & E. Woodrow Eckard Jr., The Profitability of Price Fixing: Evidence from Stock 
Market Reaction to Federal Indictments, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 309, 315–17 (1991); Robert M. Feinberg, An-
titrust Enforcement and Subsequent Price Behaviour, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 609 (1980); William M. Landes, 
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deterrence framework, whether implicit or explicit, has pervaded formulation of 
antitrust scholars and policy-makers in their approach to issues of institutional 
design regarding cartel detection and prosecution. 
This Article analyzes transformations of cartel policy using an optimal de-
terrence framework. Government cartel prosecution policy shifts occurred at 
roughly the same time that much of doctrinal antitrust underwent significant 
transformation.5 The doctrinal and policy shifts in antitrust were part of an intel-
lectual shift due to Chicago law and economics scholars as well as Harvard legal 
process scholars.6 Together, these groups of scholars advocated for a fundamen-
tal change to the existing regime of U.S. antitrust law and policy. This included 
a clear focus on economic effects,7 and a shift in civil conduct liability from per 
se illegality to a more lenient rule of reason as a result of potential efficiencies 
of the particular business practice.8 
The contribution of this Article is twofold. First, we analyze the various 
cartel policy regimes over time. In doing so, we quantify the effects of the various 
policy regimes on the number of cartels prosecuted, as well as the financial pen-
alties per individual and firm and the impact on number of days in jail for cartel 
crimes. Our research offers an empirical basis that builds off of prior theoretical 
literature that examines the impact to deterrence based on enforcement tools and 
cartel formation.9 Moreover, a series of articles have modeled incentives or have 
 
Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 656–57 (1983); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing 
the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785 (2014); John S. Thompson & David L. Kaserman, After the Fall: Stock 
Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 329, 331 (2001).  
 5. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. (1984); William E. Ko-
vacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000); 
Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2010). 
 6. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 512 n. 109 
(2006) (“Post-Chicago criticisms of current antitrust doctrine largely accept the economic approach, and call for 
modifications to existing rules based upon the application of game theoretic tools and new empirical economic 
methods.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 
ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 617–18 (2010) (“Since the 1970s both the old Harvard and the traditional Chicago posi-
tions have moved from opposite directions toward the center, partly as a result of the influence of transaction 
cost analysis. Today their differences on many issues are not all that considerable.”); William E. Kovacic, The 
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double 
Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007); Donald Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American 
Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“[Non-economic goals] would broaden antitrust’s proscrip-
tions to cover business conduct that has no significant anticompetitive effects, would increase vagueness in the 
law, and would discourage conduct that promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or proved.”). 
 7. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50–51 (1978); 
Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2497, 2506–07 (2013). But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, 268 
(1991) (“One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic 
approach’ to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’ in antitrust policy represented a 
change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception.”). 
 8. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason 
in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 734 (2012); Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Ap-
proach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation 
of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003 (2014). 
 9. See generally Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, When Should We Expect a Corporate 
Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels, 58 J.L. & ECON. 417 (2015); Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency 
and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 750 (2009). 
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offered experimental evidence under leniency to improve cartel detection due to 
the destabilizing effect that leniency may have on cartel duration.10 Through our 
examination of alternative cartel prosecution regimes, we extend the existing em-
pirical work in the area of cartel stability and duration. To the best of our 
knowledge, we provide the longest time-series data analysis for the various facets 
of cartel enforcement by the DOJ. 
Second, we offer an analysis of political effects of cartel enforcement. We 
extend prior work that examines political preferences in cartel prosecutions.11 
Due to the time-series data that we use covering the Nixon through Obama pres-
idencies, we can examine both inter-political party as well as intra-political party 
effects on cartel prosecution. Examining specific presidential administrations, 
the data shows significant variations between Republican and Democratic ad-
ministrations, as well as within each party. Our empirical analysis provides a 
basis to study how overall policy differences across administrations and political 
parties also extends to cartel prosecutions. 
Cartel enforcement and specifically questions of cartel detection and sta-
bility are difficult ones to address for researchers. Since the 1960s, theorists have 
questioned cartel stability12 while empiricists have worked to better understand 
cartel dynamics.13 A major hurdle that confounds empirical work on cartel de-
tection and duration assumes that it is possible to determine the overall number 
of cartels (a “denominator” problem).14 Cartels require an agreement by cartel 
members to collude. Yet, because such collusion is illegal, the agreements or 
contracts to collude are unenforceable by law and are instead concealed. Because 
of this concealment, it is difficult to determine the total number of cartels that 
exist at any given point in time.15 What empirical analysis can create in terms of 
a measurement proxy for cartel existence and stability is the total number of car-
tel prosecutions by the government. These criminal prosecutions are based on 
hard evidence of collusion. In more recent years, evidence of collusion has 
tended to emerge as a result of a defendant who defects from a cartel via the 
 
 10. Maria Bigoni et al., Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence, 31 J.L. & ECON. & ORG. 663 (2015); Yasuyo 
Hamaguchi et al., Group Size Effects on Cartel Formation and the Enforcement Power of Leniency Programs, 
27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 145 (2009); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs, 56 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 215 (2008). 
 11. See Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecu-
tions, 48 REV. INDUST. ORG. 405 (2016). 
 12. See generally Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experi-
mental Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, vol. 2 (Roger D. Blair 
& D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2014) (providing an overview of the theoretical literature). 
 13. See generally Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241 (1996); 
Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J.L. & ECON. S51, S51–54 
(2014); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Du-
ration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 456 (2011); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel 
Success?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 43, 44, 74 (2006). 
 14.  See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55 n.8. 
 15. Merger evaluation for example is a very different problem as the U.S. Merger Guidelines explicitly 
require companies to file for Government clearance when the transaction is above a stated value. Even if a merger 
is below the stated value, this information is readily visible, and antitrust authorities can investigate and challenge 
such a merger. The cartel problem is different as we literally have no idea about how many cartels are actually 
operating.  
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leniency program to cooperate with the DOJ for a reduction in penalties.16 His-
torically, however, the genesis of cartel investigations have been based on more 
diverse sources of information flows.17 
We organize this Article as follows: In Part II, we provide a background of 
the intellectual context for cartel enforcement. Next, in Part III, we provide de-
scriptive analysis of critical cartel enforcement events and institutional develop-
ments from 1890 to the present.18 Thereafter, we describe the data and inter-
temporal patterns in cartel enforcement in Part IV. In Part V, we develop the 
empirical specification and present the estimation results. In Part VI, we discuss 
whether there has been a potential decline in cartel enforcement in the U.S., given 
our data and findings. Next, in Part VII, we briefly compare some key data be-
tween U.S. and European Commission cartel prosecutions. Finally, we offer con-
cluding remarks in Part VIII. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Chicago School transformed antitrust.19 Cartel enforcement played a 
smaller role for the Chicago School overall, which focused on the reform of mer-
ger and monopolization enforcement.20 The lack of emphasis on cartels was due 
both in part to the overall confusion by the courts as to other areas of law as well 
as to the fact that conceptually cartel enforcement was “low hanging fruit”: the 
identification of harm by cartel behavior from the standpoint of consumer wel-
fare was simple.21 The per se application of liability to hardcore cartels made 
them less effective and destabilized them. The present structure of cartel enforce-
ment with high fines, significant incarceration, an emphasis on enforcement 
against large international cartels, and the use of leniency, is very different from 
 
 16. Scott Hammond, Deputy Assistant Gen. for Criminal Enf’t Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ad-
dress before the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust 
Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades (Feb. 25, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download. 
 17. Vivek Ghosal, The Genesis of Cartel Investigations: Some Insights from Examining the Dynamic In-
terrelationships Between U.S. Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations, 3 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 61, 64 (2008). 
 18. We limit our analysis to federal cartel prosecution.  But see Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 
The Determinants of State Level Antitrust Activity, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG. 179 (2010) (examining state level en-
forcement). 
 19. See generally Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (1955); Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1911 (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 
264 (1981); Easterbrook, supra note 5; David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for As-
sessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (2005); Benjamin Klein 
& Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988); 
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and 
Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989); Sam Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust 
Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313 (2005); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & 
ECON. 225 (1966); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
 20. See BORK, supra note 7. 
 21. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S54. 
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the primary topics that concerned academic writing from Chicago or other schol-
ars until the 1990s.22 
In the early formulation of antitrust, three thinkers dominated cartel related 
thought, all from the Chicago tradition: Stigler, Bork, and Posner. Stigler noted 
that collusion was possible but believed that cartels would break down easily. He 
offered a theory of equilibrium in a dynamic noncooperative game.23 While 
Stigler contributed to thinking about coordinated effects in mergers, the applica-
tion to cartel enforcement was limited because the implication of his work is 
exogenous conditions for each industry would determine firm interaction but ex-
plicit collusion was difficult.24 
Of the other Chicago theorists, Bork offered a holistic approach to antitrust 
reform in the Antitrust Paradox. Bork’s discussion of explicit collusion in the 
book was surprisingly short. Indeed, Bork wrote less than a paragraph on the 
topic of explicit collusion in his chapter on horizontal restraints.25 The horizontal 
restraints chapter instead focused on ancillary restraints where collusive behavior 
had offsetting efficiencies that were greater than the anti-competitive restraints.26 
In the policy chapter of the Antitrust Paradox, Bork’s cartel discussion also was 
brief. He suggested that the DOJ open more field offices across the country to 
prosecute local cartels.27 Bork’s rather short treatment of cartels reflected that as 
a matter of law and policy, cartels were both conceptually and doctrinally easy 
situations to rectify.  
Bork’s short treatment of cartels left unaddressed a number of significant 
features about the institutional structure of cartel enforcement (leniency, in-
creased fines, and increased incarceration) that were in place by the time of the 
publication in 1978 of the Antitrust Paradox.28 Moreover, he ignored interna-
tional cartel issues, which by the late 1970s were beginning to become more 
significant.29 
The third major Chicago thinker theorizing about collusion was Richard 
Posner. His early writing focused on tacit collusion as well as government anti-
trust enforcement.30 In his antitrust casebook (both original 1976 edition and 
2001 revised edition),31 Posner argued against jail time for cartel crimes. Instead, 
he supported higher fines as a penalty for cartel activity.32 Encouragement for 
 
 22. See id. at S63–64. 
 23. Dennis W. Carlton & Sam Peltzman, Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Oligopoly, 6 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 239 (2010); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
 24. Sokol, supra note 4, at 817. 
 25. See BORK, supra note 7, at 268. 
 26. Bork had concerns about misapplication of per se rules to cases. See, e.g., United States v. Topco 
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 27. See BORK, supra note 7, at 406–07. 
 28. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S53. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971); 
Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); Richard A. Posner, 
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969). 
 31. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 270 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW]; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225 (1976). 
 32. ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 31, at 270. 
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higher fines suggests a view of suboptimal cartel enforcement. Particularly note-
worthy, with the revised edition of his casebook, Posner continued to believe that 
antitrust enforcement was suboptimal even with a change of higher fines and 
significant increased cartel detection among local bid rigging cartels in the 1980s 
and international cartels in the 1990s.33 
Comparing Posner and Bork, on the three points that Posner specifically 
raised: (a) broadening legal liability for plus factors regarding tacit collusion,34 
(b) increased criminal fines (Posner favored increased fines even after the 1974 
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act),35.and (c) the use of incarceration (Pos-
ner opposed it), Bork was silent on the last two.36 We interpret the silence of 
Bork on these issues to necessitate that Bork believed cartel enforcement was 
suboptimal but for reasons different than Posner. If cartel enforcement ap-
proached optimality, advocacy of additional DOJ Antitrust field offices would 
have been unnecessary. Thus, Bork’s belief in suboptimal cartel enforcement fo-
cused on the likelihood of detection rather than on increased penalties (incarcer-
ation and/or fines).37 
The current institutional structure of cartel enforcement with high fines, 
significant incarceration for individuals, a prosecution emphasis on large inter-
national cartels rather than small local cartels, and the reliance on leniency for 
cartel detection is very different from what concerned Stigler, Bork, or Posner.   
III. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
The time period of 1960–1978 witnessed important structural shifts in the 
institutions of government cartel enforcement.38 There were three shifts in terms 
of government enforcement: fines, incarceration, and the introduction of a leni-
ency program. The shifts to higher financial penalties, greater criminal sanctions, 
 
 33. Id. at 266. 
 34. More recently, Posner has changed his view on tacit collusion and plus factors. See Richard A. Posner, 
Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 763 (2014) (reviewing Louis 
Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing (2013)). 
 35. Regarding incarceration, in late 1976, Don Baker, the then Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
presented a speech advocating a significant increase in the use and severity of criminal antitrust. Don Baker, To 
Make the Penalty Fit the Crime: How to Sentence Antitrust Felons, Remarks as Prepared for the Tenth New 
England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 20, 1976), in SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955–1980 vol. 2, at 530 (James 
M. Clabault & Michael K. Block eds., 1981). Consequently, the Antitrust Division promulgated guidelines that 
pushed for greater severity of criminal enforcement. See U.S Dep’t of Justice Guidelines for Sentencing: Rec-
ommendations in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act, in SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: 1955–1980 vol. 2, at 
550 (James M. Clabault & Michael K. Block eds., 1981).  
 36. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 37. Bork’s policy prescription of increased cartel enforcement via additional DOJ field offices suggests 
that Bork may have been less convinced than Stigler of the inherent instability of cartels. See Stigler, supra note 
23, at 61. That is, if cartels naturally fail, the case for increased cartel enforcement via more staffing of regional 
field offices would be weak. Subsequent research into cartels suggests that cartels are more successful than Stigler 
may have anticipated. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 13, at 456. 
 38. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
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and leniency39 were changes to increase probability of detection and severity of 
punishment associated with cartel behavior. Cartel related criminal fines, which 
had been raised in the 1950s for the very first time since 1890, even when ad-
justed for inflation, seem low by today’s standards.40 Additionally, cartel behav-
ior was treated as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. From a moral standpoint, 
shifting a crime from a misdemeanor to a felony also increased moral/reputa-
tional stigma for such crime.41 Leniency created the possibility of a reward for a 
firm defecting from a cartel.42 
To motivate the empirical analysis in Part V, we offer an overview of the 
significant events in the timeline of cartel policy. Enforcement began with the 
passage of the Sherman Act.43 Under the Sherman Act, the maximum fine for 
collusion was set at $5,000.44 After a half century of fines at the same level, 
Congress raised the maximum fine in 1955 to $50,000 per count.45 Incarceration 
was not used much in antitrust’s first half century.46 Starting in the late 1950s, 
however, the DOJ began an enforcement shift to greater incarceration for collu-
sion.47 For example, United States v. McDonough Co. yielded the incarceration 
of four executives.48 
Cartel enforcement became more robust in the period from 1958–1961 due 
to the electrical equipment price fixing cases.49 These collusion cases involved 
thirty corporations and forty-five defendants.50 
The cases received significant public attention due to the size of the over-
charges, the high profile companies involved in the collusion, and the relatively 
small financial penalties and jail time for “respectable” people.51 To put the fines 
in perspective, Professor Connor explains regarding the penalties, “[c]orporate 
antitrust convictions were the equivalent of corporate parking tickets.”52 
Due to the low penalties—both monetary and incarceration—imposed in 
the 1950s and 1960s, legislative changes were introduced during the 1970s to 
 
 39. It was during this period that DOJ introduced the first iteration of the leniency program. Though the 
original leniency program was introduced in 1978, DOJ Antitrust had been discussing the leniency program since 
1976, according to senior DOJ Antitrust officials at the time with whom we conferred. 
 40. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 41. See generally CRIMINALIZATION THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff, Lind-
say Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo & Victor Tadros eds., 2014). 
 42. See Maria Bigoni et al., Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment, 43 RAND J. ECON. 
368, 370 (2012). 
 43. Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2018)). 
 44. See Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 45. See Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 135, 26 Stat. 209 (1955); Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 46. Gregory J. Werden, Individual Accountability Under the Sherman Act: The Early Years, 31 ANTITRUST 
100, 103 (2017). 
 47. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 48. 180 F. Supp. 511, 514 (S.D. Ohio 1959).  
 49. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S55. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: OFFENSES IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND THE PROFESSIONS 117 (Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier 
eds., 1977). 
 52. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 43 (2001). 
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increase the severity of punishment. In 1974, Congress enacted the Antitrust Pro-
cedures and Penalties Act.53 Among the things covered under the Act were cartel 
related enforcement issues. Collusion was reclassified a felony from merely a 
misdemeanor. Further, the maximum financial penalty for collusive behavior 
was increased to $1 million.54 It took only a few years for the higher penalties to 
be implemented in cartel cases. In the United States v. Continental Group, Inc. 
cases, the DOJ secured the first set of felony convictions for collusion at trial 
with the maximum felony sentence imposed.55 
Responding to a lack of effective detection, the DOJ created its initial leni-
ency program. The leniency program, launched by the DOJ in 1978, created a 
system in which a firm could defect from a cartel and receive a reduced penalty 
from the DOJ if it came forward with information about the cartel.56 Because of 
the design of the leniency program, however, this iteration was ineffective.57 
Significant changes in cartel enforcement occurred in terms of the number 
of cases prosecuted under Reagan as well as case prioritization for merger and 
civil enforcement.58 Data show that civil Sherman Section 1 and 2 government 
enforcement significantly diminished.59 The creation in 1982 of the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, revised in 1984, also altered antitrust enforcement by in-
creasing the number of merger filings.60 These shifts in DOJ Antitrust resources 
impacted cartel enforcement.61 As a result, criminal enforcement increased under 
Reagan in terms of the number of cases and marginally in terms of penalties 
imposed.62 
Further tweaks to the structure of enforcement occurred in 1984, when Con-
gress passed the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act. The Act increased individual 
fines to $250,000.63 Further penalty enhancement came in 1987 as a result of the 
 
 53. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974). 
 54. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S56. 
 55. 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1980).  
 56. Scott Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cornerstones of 
an Effective Leniency Program, at 3 n.1 (Nov. 22–23, 2004). 
 57. Only one leniency application was received per year and not a single leniency application was for an 
international cartel. See id. at 3. An important issue also is that DOJ’s resource allocation changed shortly after 
the introduction of leniency. In 1979, the Hart Scott Rodino Act of 1976 went through its first full year of imple-
mentation. The first year of merger filing notifications totaled over 800 filings. Increasingly, merger control 
became far more resource intensive, potentially distracting from other areas of enforcement. Ghosal & Sokol, 
Evolution, supra note 13, at S57 n.10. 
 58. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S57–58. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In 1982, Congress passed the FTAIA to clarify the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. See 
Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2018)). 
 62. U.S. v. B&B Construction Co. (1981) marked the first time maximum prison terms were imposed under 
the 1974 statute.  Much of the cartel enforcement in the 1980s and early 1990s appeared to have focused on 
procurement and infrastructure collusion. William E. Kovacic, Criminal Enforcement Norms in Competition Pol-
icy: Insights from US Experience, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY MOVEMENT 45, 65–66 (CARON BEATON-WELLS & ARIEL EZRACHI eds., 2011). 
 63. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (reenacted as Criminal 
Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3571(d) (2018))). 
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (passed in 1984), which were applied to all cartel 
offenses.64 Even further changes to cartel enforcement came later with the pas-
sage of the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990.65 The Act increased maximum 
fines for collusion to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for individuals.66 
The Act also increased prison terms up to three years.67 
The 1990s witnessed a transformation of cartel detection mechanisms. 
The fundamental change to cartel prosecution occurred in 1993 when the DOJ 
revised its leniency program.68 Under the revised leniency program, the DOJ 
offered a leniency applicant automatic amnesty under two settings: 1) if there 
was no pre-existing cartel investigation, and 2) if there was full cooperation.69 
Further, amnesty was available to a leniency applicant even when cooperation 
with the DOJ began after an investigation had already been initiated.70 Finally, 
in the situation when the corporation qualified for automatic amnesty, the DOJ 
provided for automatic amnesty based on full cooperation of all directors, of-
ficers, and employees.71 
Unlike the prior iteration of leniency, this version of leniency with full am-
nesty was a major success and transformed cartel detection.72 The DOJ first pro-
vided leniency in 1995 for the lysine cartel.73 As a result of the information that 
emerged from the leniency program, cartel members settled with the DOJ in 1996 
for criminal fines of $105 million, which was a record amount at that time.74 
Additionally, cartel members paid out $305 million in private damages.75 Of 
note, the majority of lysine cartel members were international.76 This change in 
the make-up of cartel members by U.S. versus international members was sig-
nificant. Prior to 1995, fewer than 1% of all DOJ cartel indictments involved 
non-U.S. firms.77 Leniency helped to uncover more international cartels as addi-
tional international cartel cases quickly followed lysine.78 
Following lysine, a change that began under Clinton and continues to the 
present day has been the increased internationalization of cartel prosecution. The 
 
 64. Until the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines, judges were reluctant to impose significant 
sentences on white collar offenders. Sokol, supra note 4, at 795. 
 65. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S57. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Christopher R. Leslie, Replicating the Success of Antitrust Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 171, 172 (2012). 
 73. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S57. 
 74. Id. 1996 also marked the first use of the alternative fine statute (18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2018)). 
 75. CONNOR, supra note 52, at 448–55. 
 76. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S57. 
 77. Id. at S57–58. 
 78. As ICPAC (2000 at chapter 4) noted, the change in international priorities and the effect of new leni-
ency were significant within a short time span. “From 1987 through 1990, the Antitrust Division did not file a 
single criminal cartel case against a foreign-based corporation or individual. . . . By 1997, the figures had surged 
so that 32 percent of corporate defendants and the same number of individual defendants were foreign-based.” 
INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATT’Y GEN. & ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN. FOR ANTITRUST, 
FINAL REPORT 167 n.16 (2000). 
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DOJ has increased the scope and depth of its cooperation with foreign enforcers 
on international cartels including coordinated enforcement and information ex-
change.79 As current head of the DOJ Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim ex-
plains, “[w]ithout such close cooperation in criminal enforcement, I firmly be-
lieve that our most important prosecutorial tool, our leniency program, would be 
much less effective in uncovering some of the most harmful cartels.”80 
The George W. Bush presidency also introduced changes to the structure 
of cartel prosecutions. Congress passed the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhance-
ment and Reform Act (“ACPERA”) in 2004.81 The Act increased the maximum 
fine for collusion to $100 million.82 It increased prison terms up to ten years and 
increased individual fines to $1 million.83 The Act also offered single damages 
(unlike the usual treble damages) for the leniency applicant to cooperate with 
plaintiffs.84 Further, in 2006, Congress amended the wiretapping statute to in-
clude coverage of antitrust violations.85 Finally, in 2012, the DOJ closed its At-
lanta, Philadelphia, and Cleveland field offices.86 DOJ Antitrust Division field 
offices historically participated in cartel enforcement, often in smaller cases.87 
At the very end of the Bush administration, the DOJ published guidance of Fre-
quently Asked Questions about the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and 
Model Leniency Letters88 that addressed requirements for leniency, the applica-
tion process, and its operation. 
Under the Obama administration, changes came relating to individual cul-
pability within organizations as a result of the Yates memo,89 which were imme-
diately embraced by the DOJ Antitrust Division.90 Individual culpability became 
a priority within organizations as a result.91 Another change was under a small, 
highly particularized set of circumstances; the DOJ offered compliance credit as 
 
 79. Id. at 164. 
 80. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Remarks at the College of 
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 81. Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13, at S58. 
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 88. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ANTITRUST 
DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/ 
file/926521/download. 
 89. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys 
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. 
 90.  Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, 
Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 8 
(Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/download; Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes, Remarks as Prepared 
for the Yale School of Management Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference 2 (Feb. 19, 2016), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/file/826721/download. 
 91. See sources cited supra note 90. 
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a mitigating factor for lower penalties for companies involved in collusion.92 
Corporate monitors for particularly egregious cartel violators were also intro-
duced as an additional punishment beyond traditional fines and jail time.93 
Finally, under the Trump administration, the Frequently Asked Questions 
about the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters94 
were updated to reflect penalties, anonymous markers, related nonantitrust of-
fenses (e.g., bribery), Type B leniency for employees, and protections for former 
employees.95 More recently, DOJ announced a newly formed Procurement Col-
lusion Strike Force to address collusion in government procurement.96 
These changes over time suggest several tentative conclusions. U.S. cartel 
enforcement and prosecutions have undergone dramatic fluctuations over the last 
four to five decades. Unlike other parts of antitrust that went through significant 
policy transformation since the law was misguided because it was not in sync 
with developments in economic analysis, the emphasis on cartel prosecution and 
substantive law of prosecution of cartels was economically correct, but the mech-
anism of prosecution needed to be reformed. 
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION AND INTERTEMPORAL PATTERNS 
Following up on the narrative in the previous Parts, we now provide a quan-
titative look at the transformation of U.S. cartel enforcement by examining the 
intertemporal path of some of the key cartel prosecution and enforcement data 
over a long time period, 1969–2016. Subsequently, in Part V, we use this data to 
empirically estimate some relationships to highlight the effects of various policy 
and institutional shifts.   
A. Data Sources 
Our primary source of data is the DOJ’s Antitrust Division Workload Sta-
tistics for the period 1969–2016.97 The earliest date for which we have all the 
data is 1969, and the most recent year for which data are available is 2016.98 
This provides us with forty-eight years of time-series data on enforcement and 
related attributes. Data for the more recent years are available online, and for 
 
 92. D. Daniel Sokol, Troubled Waters Between U.S. and European Antitrust, 115 MICH. L. REV. 955, 974 
(2017).  
 93. See Sokol, Troubled Waters, supra note 92. 
 94. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 88. 
 95. See generally id. 
 96. Justice Department Announces Procurement Collusion Strike Force: a Coordinated National Re-
sponse to Combat Antitrust Crimes and Related Schemes in Government Procurement, Grant and Program 
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 97. Division Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations (last up-
dated July 1, 2019). 
 98. Id. 
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the earlier years we compiled the data from the Antitrust Division’s published 
paper records.  
The specific annual data series we examine include the total number of an-
titrust cases; the total number of civil and cartel cases; various penalties related 
to cartel cases such as the number of individuals incarcerated and the number of 
days served in jail; and monetary fines levied on individuals and corporations.99 
There are some nuances about the Antitrust Division’s workload statistics on 
cartel cases that are important to clarify. First, the time series on cartel cases 
relates to the number of cases filed during the year as opposed to the actual num-
ber of cartels prosecuted. Second, the DOJ’s official statistics are for the fiscal 
reporting year as opposed to the calendar year. These two aspects imply that the 
annual data on cartels need to be interpreted carefully. The additional aspects of 
the DOJ’s cartel data are as follows: the DOJ’s average win-loss record on cartels 
is near perfect, ranging from 98% to 100% for most years.100 This implies that 
(a) cartel cases filed nearly always lead to prosecution; and (b) the typical time 
from initiating a cartel case to prosecution appears to be about one and a half 
years.101 
Given the data characteristics and limitations noted above, the data on car-
tel cases are used to effectively proxy the data on cartels prosecuted. But the data 
on the number of firms and individuals prosecuted, and fines, are the actual se-
ries. Therefore, for a given year, this may create a mismatch between the number 
of cartels prosecuted versus the various prosecutions and penalties data. If a car-
tel case is decided quickly then there is no mismatch, but if a cartel case is de-
cided over a longer duration, this is likely to be a mismatch.  
In contrast to the cartel case time-series, the data on incarceration, fines on 
individuals, and fines on corporations are based on actual prosecutions during 
the year.102 The summary statistics on the fines per cartel and the fines per firm, 
along with the data on the number of firms convicted per cartel, need to be inter-
preted accordingly. Given the nature of the statistics as maintained by the DOJ, 
there is no easy way to resolve this issue. Given that our primary objective is to 
focus on the medium to long term patterns and not the short-run fluctuations, 
however, this attribute of the time-series data may not matter much. Overall, 
while these administrative and definitional aspects will not alter the long-run re-
lationships we wish to study, it is important to keep these in mind as we discuss 
the data and the estimates.  
While our data enables us to examine the shorter-run, year-to-year fluctua-
tions in various enforcement variables, our primary focus is on the more systemic 
changes under alternative policy regimes and presidential periods. The funda-
mental effects we are focusing on essentially play out over the medium-to-longer 
run. Given the characteristics of the DOJ’s cartel cases data noted above, the 
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broad time-series patterns and shifts over time on cartel cases initiated, for all 
practical purposes, will mimic the actual time-series on cartel prosecutions. 
Given this, we refer to the cartel case series as the cartel prosecutions series. 
Aside from the antitrust enforcement data, we also use some U.S. macroe-
conomic data, such as U.S. GDP. These data are from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis.103 Finally, we use data on the total number of mergers and acquisi-
tions in the U.S. economy. These data are compiled from various sources includ-
ing the U.S. Federal Trade Commission merger series, Thompson’s Financials, 
and the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances.104 All monetary data 
in our paper are measured in real 2010 dollars. In Table 1 we present the sum-
mary statistics for some of the key enforcement and prosecution indicators. 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Total cartel cases per year 44.52 23.71 
Total fines per year (2010$, ‘000) 264,940.62 405,456.32 
Total jail days per year 6,101.32 7,976.23 
Fines per cartel (2010$, ‘000) 7,068.64 10,763.38 
Jail days per cartel 164.05 248.05 
Number of individuals fined per cartel 1.22 1.52 
Number of firms fined per cartel 1.81 2.66 
 
B. Intertemporal Patterns of Cartel Enforcement  
Next we display several of our main variables in Figures 1–8 and discuss 
the patterns, keeping in mind that our data cover the period 1969–2016. Figure 1 
shows that prior to 1979–1980, the mean number of cartel cases was about 
twenty per year. The mean number rises sharply during the Reagan years to about 
sixty cases per year. Thereafter, it falls steadily reaching a low of twenty-five to 
thirty cases per year during the George W. Bush administration. The mean rate 
of cartels prosecuted during the George W. Bush administration was almost at 
historical lows, harking back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is particu-
larly revealing as our general understanding from the shift during the Reagan 
years was that enforcement importantly moved away from civil toward  
cartel enforcement.105 But the starkly low numbers during the Bush administra-
tion show a reversal and highlight the sharp variation within Republican admin-
istrations’ variation in cartel enforcement. The high mean rate of cartel prosecu-
tions is effectively offset by the historic low mean during the George W. Bush 
presidency.  
 
 103. Gross Domestic Product, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: FRED ECONOMIC DATA (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP. 
 104. Data Sets, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/open-government/data-
sets (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); M&A Statistics, INST. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, & ALLIANCES, https://imaa-
institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 105. Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics and Enforcement, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 733, 771 (2011). 
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Intriguingly, however, Figure 1 shows a sharp increase in the mean number 
of cartels prosecuted during the Obama administration. While the pre-1980 pe-
riod generally contains uniformly low numbers of prosecutions, the post-1980 
period reveals a mixed picture with highs reaching almost 100 cases and lows of 
about twenty-five. These patterns are important to highlight as the key leniency 
change occurred in 1993 with subsequent changes in penalties, which lead to a 
more effective detection and enforcement mechanism. If it were the case that 
there was a reduction in the (unmeasured) population of cartels due to the im-
proved leniency mechanism, it would be somewhat unlikely that there would be 
a sharp increase subsequently during the Obama administration. Perhaps a con-
clusion one may reach is that the Bush administrations’ stance was hands-off 
markets, irrespective of the nature of the violations, civil or cartel, which is a 
different stance from the Reagan administration, which altered the ratio with less 
civil and more cartel prosecutions.   
FIGURE 1: U.S. ANTITRUST CASES: TOTAL, CIVIL, AND CARTEL 
 
Figure 1 also allows us to put the cartel prosecutions in perspective relative 
to the Antitrust Division’s civil enforcement as well as the total. Aside from the 
Clinton administration, U.S. civil enforcement shows a dramatic decline. This is 
consistent with the Chicago School’s emphasis on efficiencies in, for example, 
both horizontal and vertical mergers as well as conduct.106 
While in this Article we do not conduct extensive econometric tests of 
structural breaks (regime shifts) in the time-series data due to our desire to reach 
a wider interdisciplinary audience, we draw on the estimation and inferences in 
an earlier paper to emphasize some of the results. In a prior article, Ghosal shows 
that the estimated structural break for cartel cases was 1979 and for civil cases 
1972.107 The estimation and testing for structural breaks showed that the sample 
mean of the cartel cases series was statistically higher post-1979, and the sample 
mean of the civil cases was statistically lower post-1972.108 One complication in 
implementing the structural break tests is the econometric methods were devel-
oped for high-frequency data with long time-series. Such data allow for more 
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sophisticated testing for “multiple” structural breaks in the data, when present. 
Our data are annual and for a total of forty-eight years. In terms of the received 
econometrics literature for testing for structural breaks, this is not a large enough 
time-series to test for multiple breaks.109 
To present a clearer picture on the greater emphasis on cartel enforcement, 
in Figure 2 we present the ratio of cartel cases and civil cases to total antitrust 
cases. The pre-Reagan years saw the ratio at about 30% on average. This ratio 
increases to an average of over 70% during the Reagan years. The ratio declines 
steadily after that, reaching a low of 36% during the George W. Bush administra-
tion, before rising again under the Obama administration. While the mean ratio 
(as well as the actual number of cartels prosecuted) clearly seems to vary between 
presidential administrations, there is also substantial variation within presidential 
administrations.110 In comparison, we see that the ratio of civil cases to total 
cases steadily declines through the 1970s reaching a low of around 10% in the 
early 1980s. Subsequently, the mean ratio stabilizes in the approximately 20% 
range. 
FIGURE 2: RATIO OF CARTEL AND CIVIL TO TOTAL ANTITRUST CASES 
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FIGURE 3: TOTAL NUMBER OF CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS FINED 
 
After having examined the overall number of cartel cases, we now focus on 
penalties related to cartel prosecutions. First, we examine incarceration time. In-
carceration time is only one aspect of penalty and is unique to U.S. antitrust. The 
European Commission, among other important jurisdictions, does not have jail 
terms for cartel offenders.111 Figure 3 shows that the number of individuals and 
corporations fined have steadily declined over time. At face value, this presents 
a puzzling picture as it may be interpreted as relatively weaker enforcement. The 
real story, however, is revealed in the subsequent figures. 
Figure 4 shows that the average number of days of incarceration has risen 
dramatically. The initial part of the sample shows an average of about 100 days 
of incarceration, but this number rises to almost 700 days of incarceration on 
average in the following part of the sample. These data show a completely dif-
ferent pattern compared to the data on total cartels prosecuted. The incarceration 
related penalties are clearly a product of the policy changes we documented ear-
lier.112 Irrespective of whether actual number of cartels prosecuted were high or 
low, the penalty regime moved to a new, higher plane. 
FIGURE 4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS INCARCERATION 
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Further detail is added in Figure 5, which displays the total number of in-
dividuals sentenced to incarceration. These data show a lot more fluctuation and 
less of a secular trend (as is the case in Figure 4). There is no definitive shift in 
the number of individuals sentenced to incarceration. The total number of indi-
viduals incarcerated increases dramatically during the Reagan administration, 
then falls to relatively low levels, before showing an uptick at the end of the 
sample. Overall, and examining the average number of days of incarceration in 
Figure 4, the clear message is the severity of penalties has increased dramatically 
over time. 
FIGURE 5: TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO 
INCARCERATION 
 
FIGURE 6: TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE FINES 
 
Next we focus on the second aspect of penalties, monetary fines. We ex-
amine total fines as well as fines on individuals and corporations. Figures 6 re-
veals that there has been an order of magnitude increase in total fines levied on 
individuals and corporations after the mid-1990s. In Figure 7 and Figure 8 we 
disaggregate the data and display fines per individual and fines per corporation. 
The fines per individual show a lot of variation over time, but lack of a clear 
secular trend. There are some large spikes in the period mid-1990s to mid-2000s, 
but aside from these peaks, there emerges no clear secular trend. The data on 
corporate fines in Figure 8, however, show that before mid-1900s the fines were 
extremely low but have large increases after that. The mid-1990s also correspond 
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to the period when the leniency program was restructured. The figures suggest 
that introduction of the revised leniency program created increased effectiveness 
for cartel enforcement (detection) and penalties. 
FIGURE 7: FINE PER INDIVIDUAL (REAL 2010$, ’000) 
 
FIGURE 8: FINE PER CORPORATION (REAL 2010$, ’000) 
 
Overall, the story that emerges for U.S. cartel enforcement from Figures 1–
8 is that the main changes in enforcement appear to be fewer in the number of 
cartels, individuals, and corporations prosecuted, but more in the increasing se-
verity of penalties in terms of incarceration time and fines. 
Finally, we examine two data series related to total funding for the Antitrust 
Division, and the ratio of cartel fines to the Antitrust Division’s funding. The 
total funding (budget) data (real 2010 dollars) in Figure 9 shows a marked de-
crease during the Reagan administration, then a secular increase over several 
years, and relatively flat levels since the 2003–2004 period. Figure 10 shows that 
the “ratio” of total cartel fines to the Antitrust Division’s budget averages around 
0.4 before the 1995–1996 period. After that, however, the mean value of the ratio 
is close to five, with highs reaching values as large as ten to twelve. This large 
increase since the mid-1990s is, of course, due to the large increase in individual 
and corporate fines we discussed in Figures 7–8.113 
  
 
 113. See supra Section IV.B. 
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FIGURE 9: ANTITRUST DIVISION FUNDING (REAL 2010$, ’000) 
 
FIGURE 10: CARTEL FINES TO ANTITRUST DIVISION FUNDING 
 
V. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Having examined the broad patterns in the data, we now turn to estimating 
the effects of various forces driving cartel prosecutions and penalties. In Section 
V.A we spell out the empirical specification. Given our desire to reach an inter-
disciplinary audience, we restrict our framework and scope of analysis only to 
the essentials. After discussing the empirical specification, we present our esti-
mation results in Section V.B.  
A. Empirical Framework 
In this Section, we develop the empirical specification to examine whether 
the institutional changes related to leniency and the new penalty programs, 
among other factors we consider below, had measurable effects on the full array 
of cartel enforcement and prosecution variables. Over our full sample period 
from 1969–2016, the number of cartel cases prosecuted by the DOJ has perhaps 
been the most visible enforcement variable. As we noted in Part IV, the fines, for 
example, show noteworthy jumps only at the end of our sample period.114 Given 
 
 114. See supra Part IV. 
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this, we structure our specification by focusing on the cases prosecuted, and then 
discuss estimation for monetary fines and incarceration days. 
There are multiple forces that are likely to influence the DOJ’s cartel en-
forcement path. In our empirical specification, we conclude a wide range of var-
iables are likely to affect the DOJ’s decisions and enforcement. The total popu-
lation of cartels is, of course, unobservable, and can only be modeled as a 
function of variables we can measure. In our empirical specification, we include 
the following:   
(1) Institutional factors (“Inst”). Several administrative and legal mile-
stones have affected cartel enforcement. It is widely recognized by antitrust 
scholars and the DOJ that the old leniency program started in 1978 was ineffec-
tive.115 The leniency program became effective when the DOJ restructured it and 
the new program went into effect in 1993, with the first leniency settlements in 
1996 (Lysine case).116 Given this, we focus on the 1993 date. We focus on two 
other institutional innovations: The Antitrust Amendments Act (1990) which in-
creased fines and jail terms; and ACPERA (2004), which further increased fines 
and jail terms.117 With the introduction of Inst features like leniency, high fines 
and incarcerations regime, we expect higher likelihood of detection and deter-
rence and less collusion. 
(2) Political factors (“Pres”). Examining the potential presidential effect is 
interesting because of the institutional structure of the Antitrust Division. The 
Assistant Attorney General, who heads the Antitrust Division, is appointed by 
the U.S. President, potentially setting the stage for shifts in enforcement with 
changes in the President and their specific priorities.118 If a presidential regime 
is such that it is placing greater emphasis on cartel enforcement, detection, and 
prosecution, we expect collusion to be lower due to the increased likelihood of 
detection and penalties. 
(3) DOJ’s investigative workload (“Busy”). First, periods of high M&A ac-
tivity may swamp the Antitrust Division with merger clearance and investigation 
work, potentially taking resources away from cartel enforcement. Second, in se-
lected instances, examination of merger-specific information during routine in-
vestigations may serve as one of the conduits for information about collusive 
 
 115. Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel For-
mation and the Cartel Price Path, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST (Vivek Ghosal & Johan Stennek 
eds., 2006); Hammond, supra note 56. 
 116. While these factors have transformed cartel enforcement, in the bigger picture these changes can be 
viewed as endogenous to broader shifts in intellectual thinking about cartel enforcement and the political will-
ingness to prosecute. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? 
Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 14–15 (2003); Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 56. 
 117. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 
(2004); Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879 (1990). 
 118. The number of cartel cases in the post-WWII period was approximately twenty per year through the 
Carter years. Prosecutions increased by 112% during the Reagan administration, and the upswing continued dur-
ing the George H.W. Bush administration. Since then, the number of cartel cases has tapered off, followed by a 
marked reduction of prosecutions under the George W. Bush administration. There was an uptick during the 
Obama administration. Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 11, at 418. 
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activity in markets (Ghosal, 2008 and 2011a).119 We use the total number of an-
titrust investigations by the Antitrust Division as our proxy for Busy. 
(4) Macroeconomic conditions (“Cycle”). Examining the effects of busi-
ness cycles on cartel activity is common in the literature.120 The main argument 
regarding Cycle is that we expect the propensity to engage in collusion to be 
higher when economic conditions are weak due to the relationship to low de-
mand.121 Our main control variable is the percentage change in GDP. 
(5) DOJ’s funding (“Funds”). An increase in the DOJ’s funding is a useful 
control as greater investigative resources signals potentially more vigorous en-
forcement. Since this is a relatively transparent signal, it has the potentially to 
influence firms’ behavior toward fewer anti-competitive activities. The previous 
empirical literature, however, indicates that the link between funding and cartel 
cases appears rather tenuous, with no clear estimated effect of funding on actual 
enforcement patterns.122 We use the percentage change in real funding as the 
control variable.123 
Combining the above variables, our specification is given by (1): 
 
 
 
 
 
Specification (1) captures the dynamic path of cartel prosecutions. In our 
estimation in Section V.B, we also use other dependent variables such as those 
related to monetary fines and jail terms. 
 
 119. Ghosal, The Genesis of Cartel Investigations, supra note 17, at 63. 
 120. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 11, at 418. 
 121. See, e.g., Dick, supra note 13, at 244–45; Ghosal, Regime Shift, supra note 105, at 744–45; Ghosal, 
The Genesis of Cartel Investigations, supra note 17, at 72–73; Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 13, at 74–75. 
 122. The picture related to funding is complicated for various reasons. First, the Antitrust Division can 
“utilize” existing staff (attorneys, paralegals, economists, etc.) at varying rates over workload cycles. When work-
load is high (low), the staff work more (less), at a higher (lower) rate of utilization. Second, the Antitrust Division 
has the ability to access additional funding for cases they are actively prosecuting, and under litigation. Third, 
the exact nature of enforcement, cases being pursued, and related attributes, can change under low versus high 
funding periods. For example, under Reagan, funding dropped sharply, but so did civil enforcement priorities. 
These are some of the reasons why the literature has had a difficult time precisely estimating the effect of funding 
on enforcement actions. For a discussion of related issues, see generally Ghosal, Regime Shift, supra note 105, 
at 751–53. 
 123. The level of funding is influenced by a combination of factors related to the complexity of cases, 
number of internal investigations, party of the President, composition of the House and the Senate, among others. 
In addition, the utilization of economists and attorneys (whose salaries are the most significant component of the 
Antitrust Division’s annual budget) vary considerably over work cycles. This variation in utilization poses a 
problem of clearly linking antitrust investigations to the level of funding. Further, since the Antitrust Division 
has to request funds from the legislature and requests for increase in funds may follow increase in investigations, 
funding may potentially be endogenous. Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical Behavior of the Department 
of Justice’s Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 27, 42–43 (2001). Ghosal and Gallo also 
found no evidence in the data that funds are endogenous. See id. 
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B. Estimation Results 
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The main inferences are as 
follows: 
TABLE 2: U.S. CARTEL PROSECUTIONS AND PENALTIES 
 
Notes:  
1.  All specifications are estimated using annual time-series, 1969–2016. LDV is 
the lagged-dependent variable, and President is a dummy variable:  
Republican=1. 
2.  The various policy regime periods are as follows: 
 Policy1: ≤1977. Pre-old leniency period. (This is excluded from the estimated 
regression as the effect is subsumed into the regression constant.) 
 Policy2: 1978–1992. Old leniency to new leniency period. 
 Policy3: 1993–2003. New leniency and Antitrust Amendments Act period. 
 Policy4: 2004–2013. Post-ACPERA period. 
3.  p-values computed from robust standard errors (two-tailed test) are in paren-
theses. A p-value <0.001 is reported as 0.001. Asterisks *, **, and ** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. ρ denotes the first-
order autocorrelation. 
(1) The Policy variables (Policy2, Policy3, Policy4) are generally not sig-
nificant for the total number of cartels prosecuted.124 But they are highly signif-
icant for the total fines per cartel and jail days per cartel. In general, they are not 
particularly meaningful for determining number of individuals jailed per cartel, 
or number of individuals and firms fined per cartel. Examining column 2 in Table 
2 related to total fines per cartel, we see that the Policy3 (1993–2003: new leni-
ency and the Antitrust Amendments Act period) and Policy4 (2004–2013: post-
 
 124. We keep in mind that since there are four Policy variables, we include three in the estimated regression 
with Policy1 subsumed in the regression intercept term.  
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ACPERA period) estimates are highly significant, with the Policy4 estimate be-
ing an order of magnitude larger than Policy3. For total jail days per cartel (col-
umn 3), we see that the Policy2 and Policy estimates are statically significant and 
quantitatively large. The Policy4 estimate is large, but the significance level is 
marginal, only at the 11% level. As with the fines effects in column 2, the incar-
ceration effects in column 3 show large policy effects. These effects tally with 
our discussions in Parts I through III related the key institutional and policy 
changes and ratcheting up of monetary fines and incarceration days that can be 
imposed. 
It is somewhat intriguing that the estimated effects of the Policy variables 
are generally statistically insignificant and quantitatively small for the three var-
iables related to: the number of individuals jailed per cartel (column 4), the num-
ber of individuals fined per cartel (column 5), and the number of firms fined per 
cartel (column 6). A lot of the official and press coverage on busting cartels since 
the prosecution of the Lysine cartel has focused on how the DOJ has gone after 
large and expansive (in terms of firms and individuals colluding) international 
cartels. While this does show up in fines levied and jail terms (columns 2 and 3), 
it does not show up in the last three columns of Table 2. 
(2) The political party of the President, with a simple Republican versus 
Democrat demarcation is only significant with a negative coefficient for total 
cartels prosecuted. The negative and significant estimate implies that over our 
full sample period from 1969–2016, somewhat fewer cartels were prosecuted 
under Republican administrations. This is perhaps not a finding one may expect 
a priori as one may expect, for example following the Reagan change in empha-
sis, that Republicans would prosecute more cartels. This negative sign is likely 
being driven by the very low, almost historically low, prosecutions under the 
George W. Bush administration. The presidential variable is not significant in 
any other column. We note that we cannot include each presidential period spe-
cifically in the estimated regression as the presidential terms have significant 
overlaps with the included Policy1 to Policy4 variables. 
(3) In general, the variables Busy, GDP, and Funds are not significant. 
These findings are similar to those in some of the earlier literature.125 As we had 
noted earlier, the complexities of allocation and utilization of the Antitrust Divi-
sion’s professionals to alternative areas of enforcement, as well as varying utili-
zation rates for staff over workload cycles, renders no clear predictions on those 
estimated coefficients. While some papers in the literature find that recessions 
lead to greater numbers of cartels prosecuted, there are other papers that find no 
relationship.  
(4) The lagged dependent variable is significant only for total cartel cases 
(column 1) and number of individuals jailed per cartel (column 4), indicating 
persistence in these variables. The lagged dependent variable is not significant 
for any of the other variables.  
 
 125. Ghosal, Regime Shift, supra note 105, at 753–55; Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 11, 
at 420–24. 
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We experimented with alternative specifications, including considering 
deeper lag lengths. Our results were similar in spirit. Our main conclusion from 
the above empirical exercise is that the policy shifts related to fines and incarcer-
ations affected those variables considerably, but do not reveal a meaningful im-
pact on total number of cartels prosecuted, or the number of individuals and cor-
porations fined per cartel. 
VI. (POTENTIAL) DECLINE OF CARTEL ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTIONS? 
As we noted in Figure 1, with some fluctuations, the DOJ Antitrust Divi-
sion is prosecuting fewer cartels.  This has been the case for a number of years, 
aside from the increase under the Obama administration. Understanding the 
causal factors may be complicated and require additional research to disentangle 
a number of potential factors. Below we discuss some factors that may be at play 
driving the secular trends and intertemporal fluctuations.   
A. Leniency is a Success, There is More Internal Compliance, and There are 
Fewer Cartels 
From the enforcement standpoint, perhaps leniency is working and there 
may be fewer cartels being formed.126 Data analytics also may be leading to 
greater internal detection and monitoring. The theoretical literature on leniency 
is that such a program increases the costs of collusion.127 Thus, the more suc-
cessful leniency has been, the more it has worked to reduce the total number of 
cartels by preventing formation as well as destabilizing existing cartels.128 
Fewer cartels formed (and hence prosecuted) may be due to an increasingly 
strong overall enforcement structure not merely in the United States but in other 
major jurisdictions, particularly at the European level due to the work of DG 
Competition.129 Significant fines for fewer cartels on the part of DG Competition 
exceed those of the Antitrust Division significantly.130 Firms have responded 
with increased compliance training that identify and mitigate situations that lead 
 
 126. This could be true as a secular trend, but it does not explain the fairly sharp increase going from the 
Bush to Obama administrations. This signals more forces are at plan than just leniency and deterrence. 
 127. See Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Pro-
gram to Result in Fewer Cartels?, 58 J.L. & ECON. 417, 443 (2015). 
 128. See Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 347, 349 (2003). See generally Cécile Aubert et al., The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs 
on Cartels, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241 (2006); Bigoni et al., supra note 42; Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 
Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation, 30 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG 528 (2012); 
Harrington, Jr., supra note 10; Harrington, Jr. & Chang, supra note 127; Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, 
Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453 (2006); Leslie M. Marx & Claudio Mezzetti, Effects of 
Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms, 2 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 305 (2014). 
 129. See generally Luca Aguzzoni et al., The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm’s 
Valuation, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 290 (2013). 
 130. Id. 
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to collusion.131 Similarly, cartel guidelines promulgated by a number of compe-
tition authorities also provide guidance on how best to create anti-cartel programs 
for firms.132  
It is possible that the increasing number of antitrust regimes that actively 
prosecute cartels, as well as European enforcement,133 means fewer global car-
tels.  Compounding the increase in cartel enforcement globally is the impact of 
how other areas of compliance may be leading to better mechanisms for compli-
ance that may impact cartel detection internally such as anti-bribery and audit 
related compliance involving accounting fraud.134 Thus, the more significant 
sanctions may be lowering the cartel crime rate.135 
B. Cartels Have Gotten Smarter and Avoided Detection  
Under this scenario, cartels are still formed but are more complex, en-
dogenizing the stricter antitrust screens and scrutiny. It may be that firms have 
learned to game leniency and are able to use leniency to punish competitors 
and/or harden existing cartels.136 In such circumstances, firms are more likely to 
come to agreement to collude but need not do so in terms of express collusion 
but mere tacit agreement. 
Tacit agreement through price signaling may have become easier over time 
given changes in case law, particularly since Twombly.137 Twombly has made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome pre-trial motions.138 The increased dif-
ficulty of private plaintiffs to bring successful cases against tacit agreement in 
conjunction with aggressive prosecution of direct evidence through leniency 
pushes rational firms to change their collusion strategy to a murkier legal area of 
tacit agreement in which “plus” factors that distinguish agreement from mere 
 
 131. Anne Riley & D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking Compliance, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 31, 54 (2015). 
 132. Id. at 45. 
 133. Pierre Cremieux & Edward A. Snyder, Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws Against Domestic and For-
eign Firms, 59 J.L. & ECON. 775, 776 (2016).   
 134. See Riley & Sokol, supra note 131, at 31. 
 135. Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence 
Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485, 485 (2001) (“A HIGHER expected sanction lowers the crime rate. This intui-
tive cornerstone of deterrence theory has garnered extensive theoretical and empirical research.”). But see Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Prob-
ability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 365–366 (1992) (suggesting that individual criminal actors 
respond to deterrence theories). 
 136. D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforce-
ment, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 203 (2012). 
 137. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[I]t is only by taking care to require 
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense 
of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ 
to support a § 1 claim.”). See generally William H. Page, Pleading, Discovering, and Proving A Sherman Act 
Agreement: Harmonizing Twombly And Matsushita, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 124 (2018). 
 138. Page, Pleading, supra note 137, at 124. 
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interdependence are not always clear.139 There are both strict140 and more leni-
ent141 readings of Twombly across circuits with regard to how much additional 
evidence is necessary.   
We suggest that the new work on partial ownership is encouraging infor-
mation leakage in ways that may (or may not) be illegal but facilitate collusion. 
A series of new papers suggest that partial ownership is correlated to greater 
collusion as a result of ownership by various mutual funds and other passive 
investors.142 In this literature, the claims are mixed. Some claims suggest that 
there is more than just mere tacit collusion but some signaling of behavior that 
might lead to greater coordination and higher prices.143 
If firms have also become more sophisticated in their explicit collusion as 
a result of partial ownership, then this may explain why total government prose-
cutions have fallen below more recent levels of enforcement. 
C. Increased (Legal) Tacit Collusion 
Posner explained that the ability of firms to lawfully, tacitly collude “ap-
pears to be common, each tacit colluder reckoning that in all likelihood the others 
will see the advantages of hanging together rather than hanging separately.”144 
Shifts in market structure have decreased the risk of certain forms of collusion. 
Gradually, as empirical work on antitrust markets bears out, at least in a number 
of markets there has been increased concentration in recent decades.145 As mar-
kets become more concentrated, it may be easier for firms to pursue strategies of 
mere tacit collusion.146 Data analytics potentially may make it easier to hide car-
tels because of massive information dumps and ability to signal more effectively 
through tacit collusion or explicitly through algorithms.147 
Another strand of the partial ownership literature lacks a causal story of 
how this price signaling is occurring but argues that even mere tacit collusion is 
 
 139. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[P]laintiffs . . . must allege 
facts that, if true, would establish at least one ‘plus factor,’ since plus factors are, by definition, facts that ‘tend[] 
to ensure that courts punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the unilateral, independent con-
duct of competitors.’”). 
 140. See In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Name.Space, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, 795 F.3d 1124, 1129–31 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 229 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 141. See SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker U.S., Inc., 801 F.2d 412, 418 (4th Cir. 2015); Evergreen Partnering 
Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 50 (1st Cir. 2013); Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 325 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 142. Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267–78 (2016). 
 143. Gaurab Aryal et al., Public Communication and Collusion in the Airline Industry 10 (Univ. of Va., 
Working Paper, Feb. 12, 2018). 
 144. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 877 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 145. Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J.L. & ECON. S101, S118 (2014) 
(finding increased concentration in American manufacturing). 
 146. See LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 133–45 (2013). 
 147. Salil K. Mehra, US v. Topkins: Can Price Fixing Be Based on Algorithms?, 7 J. EUR. COMPETITION 
L. & PRAC. 470, 473 (2016). 
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anticompetitive.148 If this literature is correct, firms have become more sophisti-
cated in their ability to legally signal behavior in the case of tacit collusion.  
D. Shift From Greater Emphasis on Domestic Cartels to International 
Cartels 
The Reagan enforcement boom in cartels was largely related to state and 
federal government bid-rigging cases.149 Many of these cases involved smaller 
cartels,150 based on the size of the fine. Starting under Clinton, the emphasis has 
been on prosecution of larger international cartels.151 This trend continues to the 
present.152 But less total enforcement in terms of number of cases at present may 
be partly due to lack of emphasis on domestic cartels (so fewer are caught in this 
category). The shutdown of the DOJ field offices in Atlanta, Philadelphia, and 
Cleveland may contribute to this asymmetry in terms of cartel size.153 
E. Private Plaintiffs and States Have not Picked up the Local Bid Rigging 
and so This Goes Undetected 
The majority of antitrust litigation is private rather than public.154 In this 
Article, we analyze the impact of public enforcement. This may not reflect the 
total dynamic of antitrust litigation.155 The relationship between public and pri-
vate enforcement is complex, including in the area of collusion. It could be the 
case in which private enforcement is a substitute for private enforcement. That 
is, the DOJ may be resource-constrained156 or under-aggressive in its cartel pros-
 
 148. See Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust En-
forcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212, 221 (2016); see also 
José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018); José Azar et al., Ultimate 
Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019), (unpublished manuscript) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252). 
But see Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less 
than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (2017). 
 149. Ghosal, Regime shift, supra note 105, at 771. 
 150. See e.g., Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions, 101 
J. POL. ECON. 518, 523 (1993). 
 151. Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Brent Snyder Delivers Remarks at the Sixth Annual Chicago Forum on International Antitrust (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-brent-snyder-delivers-remarks-sixth-an-
nual-chicago (“The Corporate Leniency Program revolutionized cartel enforcement, led to the successful prose-
cution of many long-running and egregious international cartels . . . .”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See generally Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 13. 
 154. Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 675 (2010). 
 155. Id. at 678–98; Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An 
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 905 (2008). 
 156. Connor, supra note 111, at 265 (“Without significant increases in cartel detection, in the levels of 
expected fines or civil settlements, or expansion in the standing of buyers to seek compensation, international 
price fixing will remain rational business conduct.”). 
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ecutions, taking safer cases based on leniency rather than investigating the pos-
sibility for collusion either based on news reports or based on empirical 
screens.157 
F. State Enforcement is not Active Enough in Cartel Prosecutions 
State antitrust enforcement could play a substitute role for federal enforce-
ment of cartels. Recent work regarding state antitrust enforcement, however, 
suggests that collusion is not an enforcement priority.158 Rather, enforcement 
tends to focus on national related cases that are high profile and seem to be sub-
ject to Virginia School public choice rent seeking concerns.159 Part of this mis-
match regarding cartels may also be due to the fact state attorneys general differ 
in their resources and capabilities vis-à-vis the DOJ Antitrust Division. States 
have fewer such resources.160 
Because of resource constraints and a concern that bringing cases involving 
tacit agreement are costly and difficult to prove, cases involving tacit agreement 
are cases that private plaintiffs bring rather than the government. Not all potential 
tacit agreement cases are brought because of the economics of litigation. The 
cost to defend antitrust claims may be significant for the firm defending them. 
Whereas it is relatively cheap to bring on follow-on actions to government cases 
because of a free riding effect of government investigations or settlements,161 
bringing a private case is more costly. The appeal of private cases is the possi-
bility of treble damages. In this setting, antitrust enforcement allows for substi-
tutability of private actions for government claims in the case of collusion.162 
G. Technological Innovation 
Technological innovation may be at play in impacting the number of cartel 
prosecutions. The effects of technological change may be in one or both direc-
tions. On the one hand, amassing significant data may make it easier to tacitly 
collude lawfully. Similarly, upstream or downstream firms may be better able, 
through screening technology,163 to uncover irregularities that may be collusive 
 
 157. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from Libor for Detection and Deterrence 
of Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 11 (2012). 
 158. See John A. Dove, Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General: Institutional, Legal and Political 
Considerations, 16 BUS. & POL. 291, 292–93 (2014); Robert M. Feinberg, State Antitrust Enforcement in the US 
and Implications for Small Business Entry and Relocation, 46 APPLIED ECON. 769, 769 (2014); Robert M. Fein-
berg & Thomas A. Husted, Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 997, 998 (2013). 
 159. See sources cited supra note 158. 
 160. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 877, 
887–90 (2003). 
 161. D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 697 (2012). 
 162.  David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Pri-
vate Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 870 (1990); Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Pri-
vate Lawsuits for Price Fixing, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1326, 1326 (1987). 
 163. David Imhof, Econometric Tests to Detect Bid-Rigging Cartels: Does it Work?, 483 WORKING PAPERS 
SES, June 12, 2017, at 1, 13. 
  
500 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2020 
and directly renegotiate contractual terms with one or more suppliers in a way 
that does not disrupt supply chains but that remedies anti-competitive behavior. 
On the other hand, technology may make it easier to collude through price related 
algorithms.164 The evidence for these propositions regarding AI collusion and 
fighting it is rather scarce.165 
VII. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND EUROPEAN COMMISSION CARTEL 
ENFORCEMENT  
In this Part, we draw attention to the fact that in the more recent periods 
international enforcement of cartels has gone up. In particular, the European 
Commission has been active in prosecuting high profile cartels, with relatively 
large increases in fines. While an extensive analysis of the international dimen-
sion is beyond the scope of this Article, we take a look at potential interrelation-
ships between the U.S. and European Commission (“EC”) cartel enforcement. 
It is likely that developments in European enforcement may have impacted 
U.S. enforcement and vice versa. Though empirically it is challenging to isolate 
these dynamic effects, often with enforcement of the same cases, because of en-
dogeneity concerns, in this Part we map out transformations in European cartel 
prosecutions to draw some parallels to the U.S. experience. While cartel enforce-
ment has grown in other jurisdictions, in terms of fines (EC law does not provide 
for criminalization of cartel related behavior), the United States and the EC are 
the two most important jurisdictions for government enforcement.166 Outside of 
the U.S., private rights of action at present only play a role in the UK, Nether-
lands, and Germany.167 Criminalization plays a role in an increasing number of 
countries but few cartel members go to jail outside of the U.S.168 
We briefly present a comparison of U.S. and European cartel enforcement. 
As the U.S. DOJ and the EC comprise the two largest cartel enforcement agen-
cies, U.S. cartel prosecution likely does not operate in isolation of developments 
worldwide. One issue that we did not address in our earlier discussion is that 
some of the developments in U.S. cartel prosecutions and cartel detection, par-
 
 164. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Com-
petition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1776 (2017); Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in 
the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2016). 
 165. See generally JUSTIN JOHNSON & D. DANIEL SOKOL, UNDERSTANDING AI COLLUSION AND 
COMPLIANCE, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3413882.  
 166. Martin Carree et al., European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions, 
36 REV. INDUS. ORG. 97, 99–117 (2010). 
 167. See, e.g., D. DANIEL SOKOL, DANIEL CRANE & ARIEL EZRACHI, GLOBAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE 
HANDBOOK (2014); Marianne Charrier & Gordon Downie, UK and EU Developments in Collective Action Re-
gimes for Competition Law Breaches, 35 EURO. COMPETITION L. REV. 369, 369–75 (2014); Sebastian Peyer, 
Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany From 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
331, 331 (2012); Barry J. Rodger, Why Not Court? A Study of Follow-on Actions in the UK, 1 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 104, 104–05 (2013). 
 168.  Caron Beaton-Wells, Criminal Sanctions for Cartel Conduct: The Leniency Conundrum, 13 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 125, 125–26 (2017). 
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ticularly in the later period of the sample, may be related to events in other juris-
dictions. In particular, some of the U.S. prosecutions could be related to devel-
opments in European cartel prosecutions and vice versa. 
In this Part, we briefly note some issues, present aggregate enforcement 
data, and conduct some empirical estimation to shed light on this issue.  
European cartel enforcement has gone through changes in prosecution 
tools, which we briefly summarize. The first legal prohibition against collusion 
was in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.169 Cartel enforcement for decades was rather 
sparse and penalties relatively meaningless with little deterrence value.170 Sig-
nificant fines and prosecution of cartels did not begin until after the First Leni-
ency Notice in 1996.171 Shortly thereafter in 1998, the Commission issued its 
First Guidelines172 on the method of setting fines. That was the same year as the 
first leniency applicant (Tate & Lyle) in the sugar cartel.173 
European policy initiatives increased during the 2000s, perhaps in part in 
response to developments in the U.S., and also recognizing the significant wel-
fare losses that were generated by price-fixing agreements between firms.174 The 
EC provided its Second Leniency Notice in 2002,175 which provided immunity 
for ongoing investigations. Cartel enforcement became decentralized under Reg-
ulation 1/2003,176 which allowed then Article 81 application by national courts 
and agencies. The regulation also increased powers of investigation and set up 
the European Competition Network (“ECN”).177 In 2006, DG Competition in-
troduced its Second Guidelines on the method of setting fines,178 the Third Le-
niency Notice,179 which attempted to increase transparency (and create a marker 
system), and the ECN Model Leniency program (to harmonize leniency across 
the EU).180 In 2008, DG Competition introduced its settlement notice, which 
 
 169. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 83, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
The Treaty of Rome has since evolved into the TFEU, which was signed in 2007 and is the current governing 
treaty of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. 
 170. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 11, at 406–07. 
 171. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, ¶ 6, 2006 O.J. 
(C 298) 17. 
 172. Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003, Jan. 14, 1998, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2. 
 173. Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
347, 372 (2003). 
 174. Id. at 427. 
 175. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, Feb. 14, 2002, 
2002 O.J. (C 45) 5. 
 176. Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Com-
petition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, art. 21, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1. 
 177. Id. at 4. 
 178. Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003, Jan. 9, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2, 2. 
 179. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, ¶ 6, 2006 O.J. 
(C 298) 11, 17. 
 180. EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK, ECN MODEL LENIENCY PROGRAMME, http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/ecn/model_leniency_en.pdf. 
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provided a 10% discount to participating firms.181 The first settlement case was 
in 2010.182 Finally, in 2012, the EU introduced its Second ECN Model Leniency 
program.183 
The empirical literature on European cartel enforcement is relatively small. 
The evidence to date suggests a similar trend in enforcement to that of the United 
States.184 
FIGURE 11: TOTAL EC CARTEL CASES 
 
FIGURE 12: EC CARTEL FINES PER CASE (REAL 2010$, ’000) 
 
To briefly overview the data and make some comparisons between the U.S. 
and EC, we present a few figures.  In Figure 11 and Figure 12 we display the total 
number of EC cartel cases and the fines per cartel, respectively. The time-path 
of the fines-per-cartel case is relatively similar to that of the U.S., with fines 
rising dramatically after around the year 2000. Yet, the number of cartels prose-
cuted is very low: the average over the full sample period is only 4.5 cartels per 
year. The highest observation is ten cartels prosecuted in 2001 and ten prosecu-
tions in 2014. These numbers are vastly lower than the U.S. sample mean of 
 
 181. Cartel Case Settlement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legisla-
tion/cartels_settlements/settlements_en.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 182. Id. 
 183. EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK, ECN MODEL LENIENCY PROGRAMME (2012).  
 184.  Aguzzoni et al., supra note 129, at 291; Carree et al., supra note 166, at 99–100; Leslie M. Marx et 
al., Antitrust Leniency with Multi-Market Colluders, 7 AM. ECON. J. 205 (2015); Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Effec-
tive Cartel Enforcement in Europe, 30 WORLD COMPETITION 539, 540–44 (2007); Andreas Stephan, An Empir-
ical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 537, 540–43 (2008). 
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approximately forty-two per year, with a high of ninety-six prosecuted in 1984. 
In Figure 13 we display the ratio of EC to U.S. cartel prosecutions. 
FIGURE 13: RATIO OF EC TO U.S. CARTEL CASES 
 
The argument that EU Member States have their own cartel prosecutions is 
unlikely to explain this gaping difference as one can, in a similar vein, argue that 
the individual U.S. states also prosecute cartels with some states having an active 
antitrust enforcement agenda. 
Finally, in Figure 14, we examine the ratio of total EC cartel fines per case 
to the U.S. cartel fines per case. This presents a starkly different picture, with the 
average EC fine being an order of magnitude greater than in the U.S. 
FIGURE 14: RATIO OF TOTAL EC CARTEL FINE PER CASE TO U.S. FINE  
PER CASE 
 
The overall EC versus U.S. comparisons look a bit puzzling, and the aggre-
gated data that we use do not lend themselves to a clear framework for econo-
metric analysis to examine the dynamic interlinkages. Perhaps the better solution 
for examining EC-U.S. dynamics is to examine specific cases that each jurisdic-
tion prosecuted, examine their origins, and then analyze whether one jurisdiction 
may have piggybacked on the other for specific cases or if the prosecution was 
coordinated from the beginning or benefitted later in time from the other compe-
tition authority. 
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A. Examination of Dynamic Interrelationships Between U.S.-EC Cartel 
Enforcement 
While our data are aggregate, we estimate some dynamic regression models 
to examine whether there are interlinkages between U.S. and EC cartel enforce-
ment. For example: Do U.S. (EC) cartel prosecutions increase when EC (U.S.) 
prosecutions increase? Do U.S. (EC) fines show an increase when EC (U.S.) 
fines increase? The basic idea is that if there are close relationships (in the ag-
gregate) between the cases prosecuted across the two jurisdictions, then the an-
swers to the above questions are likely to be: yes. If the aggregate data mask 
substantial heterogeneity that may be case-specific, however, then regressions 
based on aggregate data may not show clear relationships. With this caveat in 
mind, below we present three sets of regressions related to: (a) total cartel pros-
ecutions; (b) total cartel fines; and (c) cartel fines per case.  
We estimate bivariate autoregressive-distributed lag models, with one au-
toregressive lag and two distributed lags of the form: [2]𝑋(1)! = 𝛼" + 𝛼#𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼$𝑋(1)!%# + 𝛼&𝑋(2)!%# + 𝛼'𝑋(2)!%$ + 𝜀! . 
The specifications we estimate are in logarithmic-levels, implying that the 
estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.185 The specification 
(2) can be interpreted as follows. For example, in specification (2), X(1) could 
be U.S. cartel cases, and X(2) EC cartel cases. The specification implies that after 
controlling for any general time trend in the data (Trend), we can examine 
whether past U.S. cartel cases affect current cases, and whether lagged EC cartels 
cases affect current U.S. cases. This is a fairly standard bivariate specification to 
examine intertemporal interlinkages between X(1) and X(2). Similarly, X(1) and 
X(2) could be U.S. total cartel fines and EC total cartel fines, respectively, or 
U.S. fines per cartel, and EC fines per cartel, respectively. 
In specification (2), we include a linear time trend as some of the cartel 
enforcement variables (noted in Figures 1 through 8) show trends. Omitting the 
trend variable, when a trend is present, will lead to biased coefficient estimates. 
Including a trend variable when no trend is present does not diminish the model 
as the included trend variable will be statistically insignificant. So estimating the 
specifications by including a trend variable makes it more general.  
In reporting the estimates below, we use OLS to estimate the parameters of 
(2). We note two points before presenting the estimates: (a) our experiments with 
deeper lags of X(1) and X(2) did not reveal any new insights from those reported 
below; and (b) we also experimented with using the Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions estimator to estimate the parameters of (00). Our results were virtually 
identical to those reported below.  
 
 185. The conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this framework are spelled out in, for example, David 
Hendry et al., Dynamic Specification, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS (Zvi Griliches & Michael Intriligator 
eds., 1983); John Kennan, The Estimation of Partial Adjustment Models with Rational Expectations, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 1441, 1441 (1979). 
  
No. 2] U.S. CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 505 
Table 3 presents the cross-relationship between U.S. and EC cartel cases. 
Our estimates reveal that, based on aggregate data we use, there is no statistically 
significant interrelationship between U.S. and EC cartel cases. In the dynamic 
specifications reported below, the only significant coefficient is for USCasest-1, 
indicating a degree of persistence in U.S. cartel prosecutions.  
TABLE 3: U.S. AND EC CARTEL CASES 
 1.		𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠! 2.		𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠! 
Constant 5.231 
(0.455) 
-48.27** 
(0.023) 
Trend -0.002 
(0.564) 
0.025** 
(0.021) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# 0.714*** 
(0.001) 
0.404 
(0.297) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"$ - 
 
-0.853 
(0.153) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# -0.039** 
(0.046) 
-0.033 
(0.611) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"$ -0.015 
(0.237) 
- 𝑅$ 0.710 -0.034 
Ρ -0.063 -0.020 
Notes: (a) all specifications are estimated using data over 1969–2016; (b) ln denotes 
natural logarithm; (c) p-values calculated from robust standard errors are in paren-
theses; (d) the asterisks *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively; and (e) ρ is the estimate of the first-order autocorrelation. 
Next we estimate a similar bivariate specification, but with total U.S. and 
EC cartel fines. These estimates are presented in Table 4. Examining the esti-
mates for USFinest in column 1, it shows a positive trend over the sample period. 
As the coefficient on USFinest-1 is significant, it shows persistence in U.S. fines 
data. Finally, the only cross-relational coefficient that is significant is  
ECFinest-2; the coefficient is a small negative. For the estimates presented in col-
umn 2 for ECFinest, no coefficient is statistically significant. 
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TABLE 4: U.S. AND EC TOTAL FINES 
 1.		𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠! 2.		𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠! 
Constant -176.336*** 
(0.001) 
-326.696 
(0.398) 
Trend 0.092*** 
(0.001) 
0.154 
(0.445) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"# 0.355*** 
(0.009) 
1.890 
(0.122) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"$ - 
 
0.659 
(0.529) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"# -0.012 
(0.314) 
-0.238* 
(0.074) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"$ -0.032* 
(0.075) 
- 𝑅$ 0.835 0.407 
Ρ 0.005 -0.004 
Notes: (a) all specifications are estimated using data over 1969–2016; (b) ln denotes 
natural logarithm; (c) p-values calculated from robust standard errors are in paren-
theses; (d) the asterisks *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively; and (e) ρ is the estimate of the first-order autocorrelation. 
Finally, in Table 5, we estimate bivariate specifications using data on U.S. 
and EC fines per cartel, as opposed to total fines in the previous table. In contrast 
to the total fines estimates in the above table, the time trend is significant for both 
U.S. and EC fines per cartel, and the estimated elasticity is much larger for EC. 
As in some of the above estimates, the lagged dependent variable, the coefficient 
on USPerCartelFinest-1 is significant, indicating a considerable degree of persis-
tence. Aside from these effects, no other coefficient is significant. 
TABLE 5: U.S. AND EC PER CARTEL FINES 
 1.		𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠! 2.		𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠! 
Constant -154.661*** 
(0.001) 
-807.840*** 
(0.001) 
Trend 0.079*** 
(0.001) 
0.409*** 
(0.011) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"# 0.403*** 
(0.003) 
0.461 
(0.637) 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"$ - 
 
-0.389 
(0.668) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"# -0.011 
(0.466) 
-0.183 
(0.199) 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠!"$ -0.020 
(0.332) 
- 𝑅$ 0.786 0.421 
Ρ -0.017 -0.011 
Notes: (a) all specifications are estimated using data over 1969–2016; (b) ln denotes 
natural logarithm; (c) p-values calculated from robust standard errors are in paren-
theses; (d) the asterisks *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively; and (e) ρ is the estimate of the first-order autocorrelation. 
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Our overall conclusion from the estimation exercise above is that we do not 
find any obvious interrelationships between U.S. and EC cartel prosecutions or 
fines, based on aggregate enforcement data. This is not to say there are no dy-
namic interrelationships. It is more likely that if we study the same issue on a 
cartel-by-cartel basis, we may well find that specific cartel prosecutions in the 
U.S. (EC) lead to sharing of information and prosecutions in EC (U.S.), with 
consequent implications for fines and other penalties. If the dynamic case-spe-
cific linkages are few relative to the aggregate enforcement data, then aggregate 
estimation of the sort using specification (2) may not reveal clear interdepend-
ence. This line of inquiry, using a combination of case-specific information and 
aggregate enforcement statistics can be an interesting future extension. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Cartel prosecution numbers have shifted over time as a result of institu-
tional changes in the DOJ Antitrust toolkit. The three primary changes have been 
increased fines, increased incarceration, and the introduction of the revised leni-
ency program. These changes in tools have led to potential change to which 
would-be cartel members respond. A growing internationalization of cartel en-
forcement also increases the probability of detection and the amount of both gov-
ernment and private damages that firms pay for their illegal behavior. Would-be 
and current cartel members may be adapting to the current structure of cartel 
enforcement. Further tweaks to the enforcement system are likely to be intro-
duced for enforcement to keep up with collusion.   
Overall, we find that cartel prosecution has shifted over time to a larger set 
of penalties for violations but with fewer total cartels caught. These results paint 
an incomplete picture. They do not directly explain whether or not cartel prose-
cutions have made collusion more or less difficult, how mechanisms for coordi-
nation across firms for collusive behavior may be changing in response to pros-
ecutions, nor do they capture how doctrinal changes in tacit agreement or 
technological innovation may be shifting what may be observed. Yet, our find-
ings do allow for observations across changes in the economy, presidential ad-
ministrations, political parties, merger waves, government enforcement in Eu-
rope, and other factors to fill in important gaps as to at least some attributes of 
the overall enforcement picture. The overall enforcement profile continues to 
change and will require ongoing qualitative and quantitative empirical study to 
better inform policy decisions. 
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